\u3cem\u3eStudent Article\u3c/em\u3e: Sierra Leone\u27s  Conflict Diamonds : The Legacy of Imperial Mining Laws and Policy by Martinez, Ian
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 SPECIAL ISSUE: 2001-2002 AFRICA AT 




Student Article: Sierra Leone's "Conflict Diamonds": The Legacy of 
Imperial Mining Laws and Policy 
Ian Martinez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ian Martinez, Student Article: Sierra Leone's "Conflict Diamonds": The Legacy of Imperial Mining Laws and 
Policy, 10 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 217 (2001) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol10/iss2/18 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more 
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu. 
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: "CONFLICT DIAMONDS"
Sierra Leone's "Conflict Diamonds": The Legacy of Imperial
Mining Laws and Policy
Ian Martinez*
Introduction1
A common misconception is that the current civil war in Sierra
Leone is the result of illicit diamond mining. True, diamonds were the
fuel of the latest flare-up of fighting. Illicit diamond digging emerged
simultaneously with the discovery of alluvial diamonds in the country.
The British, unwilling to pay for the costs of patrolling or controlling the
hinterland-where diamonds are found-sought a colonial compromise.
Their policy was twofold: a) to institute indirect rule through the
traditional paramount chiefs and b) to use a tributary system whereby
miners received a share of diamonds they recovered in lieu of wages.
Eventually this system degraded government rule and led to a rise in
corruption. The efforts to control the illicit diamond led, in time, to the
rise of a "shadow state."2 The colonial governance planted the current
mindset that infects Sierra Leone like a malignant tumor. The patient
lived, infused with donor medicine as its lifeblood, diamonds, were
sucked away. Finally, the 1990s saw the tumor explode into an orgy of
violence. This article explores the genesis of the illicit diamond trade and
the continuation of that policy after independence.
I. Colonial Development
A. Early History and British West African Policy
The British settled the area now known as Freetown as a
settlement for freed slaves in 1787. Freetown, "province of freedom" was
the site of missionaries and a university-Fourah Bay College,
established in 1827. While the coastal settlement flourished, the colonial
government was unwilling to enter the interior and establish their control
over it. In 1898 the Hut Tax War erupted against British rule and
taxation. After the treaties and a pacifying war, the British solidified their
position in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, in a tacit recognition of their
incomplete domination of the interior of the colony, colonial officials
sought to co-opt the interior chiefs and assign them various tasks.3
*(J.D.) University of Miami School of Law; 2002; U.M. Int'l & Comp. L. R., Editor-In-Chief;
(M.A.) Florida International University; (B.A.) Temple University; former Intelligence Officer with
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency covering Africa. I want to dedicate this article to my wife and
new born daughter, Isabella. All errors in this article are mine.
1 For another view on the Sierra Leone conflict, please see the preceding.-Eds.
2 See WILLIAM RENO, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN SIERRA LEONE, 29 (1995); JOHN
HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, 23 (200 1).
3 Id.
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British Imperial policy in Africa had two forms of government:
a) colonies under traditional local rulers such as chiefs; and b) colonies
of white European settlement overseen by British administrators.4 The
first was representative of most of West Africa, the latter of places like
Kenya, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. Yet, in Sierra Leone the
British initiated a dualistic approach to governance. Chiefs governed the
interior of the country, and Freetown was governed by Creoles, overseen
by British colonial administrators.
In line with their policy and in recognition of their inability to
exercise full control of the interior, the British sought an accommodation
with the country's chiefs. The British aimed to support a stable class of
intermediaries-the tribal chiefs of the interior of the country-who
would promote internal stability and colonial efficiency at a low cost.
Ten percent of the population in Kono lived in servitude to the chiefs. "It
was the chiefs, not Freetown, who exercised direct control over the
protectorate's population."5 To further save money, the chiefs were even
given control of their own police force in 1921 6
The interior of the colony was still a "malaria-infested swamp"
in the 1920s. Young colonial officers were sent to Sierra Leone, with the
hope of transferring out as quickly as possible. As a result they turned a
blind eye to informal appropriations of state resources and illegal
activities in return for assurances from chiefs and others to maintain the
peace.7 This further led to indiscriminate acts by chiefs who knew local
or London officials would not question their actions.
As the British built up their presence in the interior of the
country through colonial officers, London worried about administrative
costs and the colony's chronic fiscal shortfalls. To exploit Sierra Leone
economically and to pay for the growing costs of colonizing the interior,
the British colonial government began a systematic routine geological
survey in 1926. The survey led to the discovery of several mineral
deposits in 1927. In 1927 the Minerals Ordinance Act vested control over
mineral rights in Sierra Leone upon the British Crown.8 Digging by
Africans for minerals was made illegal. 9 The colonial government
envisioned no role for Sierra Leoneans, other than laborers for British
mining companies who would have monopolies over all minerals. 10 In
January 1930, the Sierra Leone Geological Survey Department
4 P.J. MARSHALL, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 102 (1996).
5 Reno, supra note 1, at 44.
6 Reno, supra note 1, at 37.
7 See id. at 31.
8 See Laws of Sierra Leone, Minerals Ordinance, Vol. IV Chapter 196, 1 (Jan. 1, 1960).
9 See id. at 2.
10 See Reno supra note 2, at 47.
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announced to the world and to the British Empire, that alluvial diamonds
had been discovered in Sierra Leone's southeast Kono District." The
discovery would be a blessing and curse for the people of Sierra Leone.
The Selection Trust Ltd., a London-based holding company with
investments in mining copper, zinc, diamonds, and gold, formed
Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd. (CAST) in 1922 for the sole
purpose of mining in British West Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone.
Selection Trust Ltd., held a controlling interest in CAST, with the other
shares held by De Beers and the public. In March 1931 CAST led a
second diamond expedition into Sierra Leone's Kono district. CAST
reconfirmed the original discovery and found more deposits. CAST then
immediately applied for an Exclusive Prospecting License (EPL) from
the Colonial Office in London.12 In what would be a nominal policy of
vesting control of mining to successive concessionaries or parastatals for
the next 50 years, on June 1, 1932 CAST was given an EPL from the
Colonial Office. The EPL covered 4,170 square miles of territory inside
Sierra Leone. In return, CAST was to pay rent, a five percent export tax,
and a five percent profits tax to the Colonial Administrators in
Freetown. 13
The government's decision to extend the SLST lease to include
the whole country coincided with a shift in colonial macro-economic
policy. From 1850 until 1932 the British Empire was governed by free
trade. But in 1932, the British introduced protectionism to the Empire in
response to the Great Depression. Raw materials and food shipped to
Britain were exempt from high tariffs meant to block out non-imperial
trade. 14 Colonies were thus encouraged to focus on one commodity and
to ship it to the Imperial metropolis for processing.
One advantage of a corporate mining monopoly was that it
possessed the legal means to control illicit indigenous mining since the
colonial government did not have, nor would London provide, the
resources to eradicate it.'" To control illicit mining, SLST made informal
payments to any chief who agreed to withhold settler rights and control
migration in Kono. Restricting settlements in the area meant fewer
people would be outside the control of the chiefs or inclined to mine
11 GREENHALGH, PETER, WEST AFRICAN DIAMONDS 1919-1983: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 47
(1985); TIMOTHY GREEN, THE WORLD OF DIAMONDS 113 (1981) (Alluvial diamonds form the bulk
of world-wide diamonds and are found over large land areas where they have been scattered by
ancient rivers).
12 Id. at 60.
13 See id. at 49.
14 See Marshall supra note 4, at 112.
15 See Reno supra note, 2 at 48.
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illegally. A single British company similarly monopolized the iron ore
industry. Both companies refused to publish their profits.
16
B. The SLST Diamond Monopoly
By 1933 more discoveries were made which hastened a second
EPL application and introduced the possibility of a countrywide
monopoly over diamond mining. In 1935 the Sierra Leone Colonial
Legislative Council granted CAST exclusive mining, exploration,
production, marketing, and prospecting rights in the colony for a period
of 99 years. 17 In exchange, CAST would create a new company, which
would be the actual vested owner of the rights, pay a yearly rent of
£7000, and pay 27.5 percent of net profits to the colonial government of
Sierra Leone which would be used for indigenous purposes." The Sierra
Leone Selection Trust Ltd. (SLST) was formed in April 1934 with CAST
holding all the shares.19
Since alluvial diamonds are scattered in wide areas, they
therefore require mechanized equipment to move massive tones of gravel
to sift for meager carats. In order to exploit those alluvial diamonds,
mechanization was introduced in 1935 to sift faster. This is one reason
why the Colonial Office may have opted for an international firm with
the financial backing to purchase and import the heavy machinery
required to move large amounts of earth.
C. The Relationship Between SLST & Local Africans
The relationship between SLST and the local Africans was rocky
from the start. Although SLST paid surface rent to the Colonial Tribal
Authorities, the amount was trivial. SLST did compensate local Africans
for the destruction of any housing, crops, or sacred ritual sites caused by
mining operations.2" But the money paid was nowhere near the profits
being raked in. Local Africans soon realized the value of this precious
mineral and began to illegally mine near the SLST sites. Since mining by
local Africans was illegal, SLST turned to the colonial administrators to
further curtail this lucrative operation. In 1931, SLST pressed for
legislation limiting Africans' access and right to deal in diamonds. By
16 H.L. VAN DER LAAN, THE SIERRA LEONE DIAMONDS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY COVERING THE
YEARS 1952-1961 54 (1965).
17 See Laws of Sierra Leone: Diamond Agreements and License (Ratification), Vol. IV, Ch. 196
(Jan. 1, 1960); I. Smillie et al., The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human
Security (2000), available at http://www.web.net/pac/pacnet-1/msgOO09.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
18 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 52; BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, SIERRA LEONE: THE
MAKING OF A NATION 15 (1960).
19 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 48; BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, supra note 18, at 15.
20 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 109.
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the mid-1930s, illegal African digging was sapping revenue in the EPL
and lowering SLST's contribution to colonial coffers.21 In 1934, in
response to these events, possession of diamonds by persons other than
members of SLST was made illegal.22 In a prelude of the 1990s and the
use of private armies, by 1935, the SLST had established its own
Diamond Protection Force to guard against thefts and illegal diamond
23mining.
Sir Ernest Oppenheimer seized the reins of De Beers (the
diamond empire of Cecil Rhodes, eponymous founder of Rhodesia and
of the prestigious Rhodes Scholarships) in 1929-mere months before
the U.S. stock market crash. Demand for diamonds had decreased
significantly because of the Great Depression. Several mines were closed
in South Africa, and the Oppenheimer family was seeking lower
production in Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone. The SLST balked, but
other events soon forced the company to rethink its policies. In 1938
Ernest Oppenheimer found himself with no place to market his wares.
Rather than risk a plunge in the status and price of diamonds, he sent his
29-year-old son, Harry, from Johannesburg, South Africa, to New York
to meet with the N.W. Ayer advertising agency. The plan was to
transform America's taste for small, low-quality stones into a luxury
market taste that would absorb the excess production of higher quality
gems that were no longer selling in Europe. N.W. Ayer saw the
challenge as one requiring a solid grasp of mass psychology, and
consequently, Ayer meticulously researched the attitudes of American
men and women about romance and gift giving. From this research, the
slogan "A Diamond Is Forever" was born. Ayer and De Beers launched
the most sophisticated marketing campaign known to the world, which
equated one's love to the size of a diamond. The resulting diamond sales
in the United States of America (U.S.) managed to keep the diamond
industry afloat.
In 1939 war broke out in Europe and the non-industrial diamond
market all but collapsed. The U.S. was the sole market for diamond sales.
Profits fell as labor shortages and a lack of spare parts led to rising
operating costs. 24 As a result of these inefficiencies, production fell even
further and revenues into the colonies' coffers suffered accordingly.
D. Post World War II & the Road to Independence
After World War II (WWII), African participation in the mining
industry rose dramatically. This can be traced to: first, the ease of mining
in alluvial plains without making large investments; second, the
21 See id. at 152.
22 See BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES supra note 17, at 15.
23 See Hirsch supra note 2, at 27
24 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 55.
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loosening of colonial and foreign control over mining; third, the rise in
diamond prices following World War II; and fourth, returning African
soldiers and their increased desire for colonial independence.
25
As far as control over mining went, the new Labour government
in Britain instituted a new policy for the colonies. Labour wanted to see
flourishing colonial economies upon which self-government could be
built. Labour also wanted the colonies to increase commodity production
in order to earn hard currency for the metropolis before independence.2 6
These colonial commodities would outlast the Empire and bind those
newly independent nations to the markets in Britain. Colonial officials
were instructed to bring Africans directly into the modem economy and
to take a more direct role in shaping the colonial economies in order to
meet that goal.27
The third reason Africans began to mine diamonds was the
soaring costs of diamonds. The U.S. accounted for most of the
consumption. With the demobilization of U.S. forces following WWII
and the increase in post-war marriages, the diamond market rebounded.
As Europe recovered from the war, De Beers turned to the reconquest of
its old market.
Finally, returning African Commonwealth soldiers soon
discovered the true price of diamonds, according to an African dealer in
Sierra Leone: "It was not until our brothers, who had been traveling in
the war, came back and told us they were worth much money that we
started looking [at them] .,,28 Africans, who wanted self-determination as
recompense for their participation in fighting for the Allied cause, also
wanted a piece of mining operations. This increased self-awareness led
Africans to challenge the SLST's monopoly. Returning soldiers soon
increased pressure at all levels, and the early 1950s were pivotal years
for their actions and demands. The African-led Sierra Leone Legislative
Council forced the diamond and iron ore companies to publish their
profits for the first time in 1952.
The local Africans continued their relentless pressure, and in late
1952, the Legislative Council-controlled by Freetown's Creoles-went
to Britain to renegotiate the terms of SLST's and DELCO's iron-ore
monopolistic agreements. A new combination tax, the Income and
Diamond Industry Profit Tax, was introduced. The tax placed a 60
percent levy on diamond profits and repealed the former Income tax of
45 percent. The rise in taxation was offset by a reduction of British
25 See id. at 25.
26 See Marshall supra note 4, at 90.
27 See Reno supra note 2, at 56.
28 See Grennhalgh, supra note 11, at 114.
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corporate taxes on both companies. 29 As SLST's control lapsed, illegal
diamond mining increased with deleterious consequences.
Sierra Leone's food scarcity problems in the 1950s illustrated the
flaw in colonial economics. The capital, Freetown (which was receiving
generous development funds from the Labour government), was at the
mercy of the interior food-producing areas. In 1952, crop failures
devastated eastern Sierra Leone. Without food to cultivate, many turned
to elicit digging to supplement their earnings.30 As word spread about the
lucrativeness of illegal mining, teachers, public service workers and
other laborers left their jobs to try their luck in digging.3 Agriculture,
construction, trade, and the transportation industries were all affected by
the transfer of labor. Soon, prices rose for basic commodities as
thousands left the cities to mine. The rice market-the main staple crop
-collapsed in 1954 due to crop failures and farmers leaving their fields
to dig for diamonds. Rice prices soon rose beyond the reach of laborers
in Freetown, and in February 1955, food rioting broke out. In 1955, a
group of miners also stormed the SLST security forces and police station.
The riots underscored the economic upheaval caused by the massive
transfer of labor resources from the agricultural sector and other vital
industries to illegal diamond mining. To stem the flow of skilled urban
workers and rural farmers to the fields in Kono, the colonial government
responded by raising skilled and semi-skilled wages by 20 percent.
The turmoil of the early 1950s led to a sharp increase in illegal
African diggers.32 The presence of so many illicit diggers increased their
share of production. African diggers smuggled out illicit diamonds
through Liberia, robbing the SLST of its stock and the Colonial
government of revenue. Corruption by the interior police, who were
controlled by the chiefs, led to increased illegal digging. According to a
British Mining Executive, "anything can be fixed with a little 'dash'
(bribe); this is the land of the waving palms."33 In 1954, SLST dove into
co-opting the chiefs by providing them payoffs to control illicit mining.
The company began making unauthorized payments to chiefs for
"development purposes," provided security for the chiefs, and extended
loans to them for cars and building materials. Soon the local chiefs were
wielding immense economic and political power. These efforts
undermined the colonial government's efforts to regulate the diamond-
mining sector and to stamp out corruption in the waning days of the
colony.34
29 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 4.
30 See British Information Services supra note 17, at 15.
31 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 9.
32 See id. at 9.
33 See Green supra note 11, at 114.
34 See Reno supra note 2, at 65.
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In 1954, legislation to limit African digging, which was already
illegal, was supported by African Ministers who had been running Sierra
Leone's internal affairs since 1951. A detachment of the Sierra Leone
Police Force was sent to augment the Diamond Protection Force of the
SLST. The SLST began constructing security posts, manned by the
SLST force on important sites.35 After the riots in Freetown, the number
of illicit African diggers rose to nearly 40,000 and their share of
diamonds increased from around 200,000 carats in 1952 to some 2
million carats in 1956.36
In 1955, growing government sensitivities and African pressure
forced the SLST to reduce its exclusive mining rights to an area of just
230 square miles for thirty years.3 7 SLST's 99-year monopoly was finally
crushed. SLST received £1,570,000 in compensation from the colony for
the confiscated lands. 38 The colonial administrators granted local miners
the right to engage in legalized small mining operations.
In 1956, the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS),
composed of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Rules, the Alluvial Diamond
Mining Ordinance, and other legislation, was passed.39 ADMS made all
previously illicit African mining areas into licensed areas. As a result,
Africans could legally mine for the first time since 1927 when mineral
possession by Africans was criminalized. 40 The ADMS, although
amended several times, still forms the basis of licensed digging in Sierra
Leone today. The digging licenses last for about six months, but there are
provisions for one- or five-year licenses. 4' The licenses can be issued to
either Sierra Leoneans or firms in which they have a majority
ownership.42 The filing fees were set low, about £9 for a yearly license in
1956. The digger has to pay additional fees to the tribal authorities,
called surface rents, which usually were about £10 a year. In addition,
the Ordinance established a diamond buying organization and a system
35 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 57.
36 IRVING KAPLAN, et al., AREA HANDBOOK FOR SIERRA LEONE, 305 (Foreign Area Studies -
American University, 1976).
37 See Sierra Leone Diamond Agreement, Ch. 210 (1955); Greenhalgh, supra note 11, at 57;
PACNET, supra note 17.
38 British Information Services, supra note 18, at 16.
39 See Sierra Leone Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance, Ch. 198 (1956); Diamond Industry
Protection Ordinance, Ch. 199 §3(2) (1956).
40 See supra. Ch. 198, at § 4(1); Habib v. Attorney-General, 1957-60 ALR S.L. 24 (Sierra Leone
Sup. Ct. 1957) (illegal trading in diamonds abrogated by Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance).
41 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 67; Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance, supra note 38, at §3
(2).
42 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 71; Kaplan, supra note 36, at 305; PACNET, supra note 17.
In 1956, it was estimated that 75,000 illicit miners were in the Kono District alone.
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for exporting diamonds-which in 1959 became the sole exporter of
diamonds-under license from the government. 43 Diggers were also
allowed to sell diamonds to the Diamond Corporation, an affiliate of De
Beers. Penalties were set for those who were not licensed or possessed
illegally mined diamonds.44 In 1956, the Diamond Industry Protection
Ordinance was passed, requiring that strangers (non-residents of the
Kono District) obtain a license to settle in the Diamond Protection
Areas.45 Nonetheless, some 40,000 foreigners (Lebanese, Guineans, and
others) were removed from Kono and driven out by the colonial
government.46
But as always, colonial officials were weary of spending money
on equalizing the playing field for Africans. London would not pay for
what it preached. To implement this new licensing scheme, the colonial
officials turned once again to the chiefs-the true middlemen in the
country. Kono chiefs approved licenses, assigned lands for mining, and
collected surface rent. The only individuals with enough money to
purchase the diamond licenses were Lebanese businessmen and
Freetown Creoles. These two groups once again alienated the inclusion
of Africans in the new post-monopoly economy. A Kono businessman
complained that unofficial payments to chiefs increased 500% as a result
of the chief s authority under the licensing scheme.47
These moves were meant to supply a steady stream of revenue
into the Sierra Leonean treasury, to provide jobs, and to minimize the
depletion of diamonds. Economic development flowed through the now
regulated industry. Markets were built and communications were
improved and shopkeepers did brisk business.48 The new regulations and
tightening of security led to smugglers leaving to Liberia and creating a
conduit for diamonds through that country.4 9 In order to work in
conjunction with African diggers, the SLST introduced contract mining
on its lands in 1959. °
43 See British Information Services supra note 18, at 16; Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance,
supra note 36, at Ch. 198 §9.
44 See Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance supra note 38, at Ch. 198 §18(1-4), §21, §24(1).
45 See Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance supra note 36, at Ch. 199 §3(2); Saccoh v.
Commissioner, 1958 ALR S.L. (Sierra Leone Sup. Ct. 1958) (Defendant was not within a diamond
producing area and hence could not be prosecuted under Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance for
being a stranger).
46 See Hirsch supra note 2, at 27
47 See Reno supra note 2 at 63.
48 See Van der Laan supra note 16 at 19.
49 See PACNET supra note 17.
50 See id. at 73; British Information Services, supra note 18, at 16.
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On the eve of independence, diamonds accounted for nearly half
of all domestic imports.51 Sierra Leone left the 1950s on its way towards
independence. Nonetheless, the British, in their final days, did little to
dispel the economically powerful chiefs, the inequities of poverty, and
the lucrativeness of illegal mining. Within the colonial government, there
were doubts about the post-independence viability of the colony.52 The
question seemed to be whether Sierra Leone would be blown away by
the "winds of change" sweeping Africa.
II. Post-Independence, a Continuation of British Policy:
Government Policy from 1961 to the Stevens Years.
A. Government Meddling Begins
On 27 April 1961, Sierra Leone, led by Freetown's Creoles,
became the third British dependency in West Africa to gain
independence. The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was the first
governing party. The SLPP was controlled by the Mende ethnic group
and supported by the Creoles from Freetown who wished to continue the
traditional role of chiefs in the economy. 3 At independence time, Sierra
Leoneans were invited to join the boards of both DELCO and SLST.
The first economic crisis for the new government started before
independence in January 1961. From 1932 to 1960, SLST earned hard
currency by selling its diamonds to the De Beers controlled CSO. CAST,
the parent company of SLST, and the CSO negotiated the contracts in
five-year periods. In January 1961, SLST did the yet unheard of action of
breaking away from the De Beers' cartel, selling its diamonds to two
American firms. The reason for opting out of the De Beers CSO were the
low prices paid to SLST for diamonds mined.
5 4
The reasons for the clash with De Beers for higher prices are
twofold. First, the ADMS SLST had only a thirty-year contract to mine
the remaining diamonds in its exclusive areas. Thus, it needed to extract
and sell its production as fast as possible. Yet, this was counter to De
Beers' policy of not flooding the market with diamonds. The price of
diamonds remains high because De Beers, through the CSO, buys
diamonds and controls their supply. Without the CSO and the De Beers
marketing campaign of the 1930s, diamonds would be worthless.
Second, African diggers had depleted diamonds at the surface or
had pock-marked the surface of the land to such an extent as to hamper
SLST's heavy equipment from operating properly, forcing SLST to dig
51 See British Information Services supra note 18 at 15.
52 See THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: WHITE MAN'S CONQUEST OF THE DARK
CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 675 (Random House, 1991).
53 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 174.
54 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 148.
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deeper and longer for diamonds. No longer could the company simply
search the surface for diamonds. SLST now had to dig deep to recover
diamonds.
The American firms were willing to pay higher prices to
circumvent the CSO. The break meant that Sierra Leone received higher
income taxes from SLST and higher Diamond Industry Profit Taxes.
Nonetheless, in 1962 the SLPP, under pressure from De Beers, passed an
act that required that all diamonds mined by SLST be sold to the
government, who in turn would sell the diamonds to the CSO.5" Rather
than going through De Beers, SLST stopped exporting diamonds
altogether in September 1961.56 Freetown sided with the CSO's estimate
that diamond reserves were not as low as the SLST feared and that it was
more important to have a stable diamond market.57 The SLPP wanted
long-term revenue and jobs rather than a quick infusion of revenue.
SLST refused to budge and continued to withhold its diamonds for
export until January 1963, when a new law was passed. The law allowed
SLST to sell fifty percent to the CSO and the remainder to purchasers
who would be licensed by the government.5 8 SLST released 700,000
carats (a full years' worth of production) in January 1963 as a result of
the new law. 9
B. Trying to Shore up the Economy & the Government
The late 1960s were economically and politically tumultuous for
Sierra Leone. In 1966, GDP declined by 2.1%. Exports dropped in 1965
and 1966 to dangerous levels, exhausting foreign reserves. In October
1966, a stabilization program from the IMF was implemented.60 In 1967,
two steps were taken to reverse the decline in foreign exchange. First, the
SLPP introduced new legislation that raised SLST's tax liability from 60
percent to 70 percent.61 Second, the government devalued the currency,
the Leone.
During the 1967 campaign season the former Minister of Mines,
Stevens, called for the expulsion of SLST altogether.62 In March 1967,
Stevens was victorious at the polls by pledging anything to anybody.
Stevens quickly turned the presence of SLST into a political issue. On
March 23, 1967 the Sierra Leonean army, led by ethnic Mendes,
55 See Act to Control the Marketing of Diamonds Produced in Sierra Leone, Act No. 3 (1962).
56 See Van der Laan supra note 16, at 145.
57 See id. at 151.
58 See Sierra Leone Public Notice No. 79 (July 21, 1962).
59 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 217.
60 See id. at 213.
61 See The Diamond Supplementary Agreement (1967) Ratification Act 1970.
62 See Greenhalgh supra note 11, at 217.
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launched a coup d'&tat, claiming they wanted to halt government
corruption.63 On January 25, 1968, another coup rocked Sierra Leone.
Then on April 18, 1968, the coup was reversed by another coup and
Stevens was allowed to assume power. In November 1968, violence
ripped the capital and was brutally suppressed by Stevens. Sierra Leone's
political and economic house was unraveling by the close of the 1960s.
C. The 1970s: The Deconstruction of the Inherited Colonial
Movement
Stevens wanted to build a political organization capable of
replacing the inherited colonial authority he wished to destroy-the old
Creole elite and the chiefs. To create and reward his new following,
Stevens would dismantle his inherited colonial economy. To do so,
Stevens needed to control the resources of Sierra Leone-diamonds
being foremost-so that he could redistribute through state patronage the
resources to his followers. The nationalization of the SLST would be the
first step and would allow him to control all of the wealth that flowed
from legitimate mining. Stevens would then divert the mining revenue
flow into the state's coffers, where he would exercise direct control.
64
Stevens could then award mining contracts, digging licenses, and money,
as well as appoint positions where necessary. This new economic order
amounted to "Black Colonialism" for the majority of Sierra Leone's
population.65
As his first step, the government took over 51% of the SLST's
shares and changed the name to the National Diamond Mining Company
(DIMINCO) in October 1970.66 The SLST was retained to provide
technical management. Stevens and his right hand-man, a Lebanese
diamond businessman named Jamil Mohammed, now took all
DIMINCO's decisions.67 The creation of DIMINCO allowed Stevens to
award his people with jobs, money and accesses to diamonds.68
Stevens used Lebanese middlemen because they could be
expelled at will due to their foreign status and due to the inherent
unpopularity of the fact that they kept wealth out of the hands of
blacks.69 Stevens' followers, who were mining diamonds, wanted to opt
out of the De Beers purchasing scheme. They quickly found that most
63 See PACNET supra note 17; SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS & ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS
& CONSTRAINTS, 8 (Yale Univ. Press) (1990).
64 See Reno supra note 2, at 88.
65 See id. at 131.
66 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 306; Green, supra note 11, at 116.
67 See PACNET supra note 17.
68 See Reno supra note 2, at 93.
69 See id. at 133.
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banks, such as Barclays, refused to extend them credit. The only ones
that did were Lebanese banks.
In the 1973 election, the SLPP was intimidated and harassed by
Stevens' followers and militia. The SLPP also saw its newspaper
banned.70 In 1974, another unsuccessful coup was launched. Finally in
1975, Stevens banned all political parties and declared Sierra Leone a
one-party state.
In 1974, Stevens introduced a five-year plan whose major
objectives were to raise the standard of living, provide greater self
sufficiency and diversification, and reduce regional economic
imbalances. The mining of bauxite, ilmenite, and rutile, as well as the
production of rice (the staple crop), were given top priority. 71 From 1973
to 1976 one-third of the total value of DIMINCO's diamond production
went to the government in dividends and income taxes.72 In 1973, the
government shut down DIMINCO's railways, which linked the mines
with Freetown. 73 The rail lines had been poorly maintained since the date
of independence, and by 1974, much of it had been ripped up in portions
74and sold for scrap.
A year after the 1973 election, Stevens granted private diamond
export licenses totaling 20% per annum of the country's total production
to five personal friends. One close friend, Jamil, alone received 12%.
Other friends received the favor of not being required to repatriate
foreign exchange earnings from the overseas sale of diamonds. This
generous exemption from repatriation contributed to chronic foreign
exchange crunches since diamonds were the number one foreign
exchange earner.75 After the installation of Stevens' cronies, revenue
from diamonds dropped, as the cronies skimmed from the top of
DIMINCO, creating a cash shortage of more than 60% by 1976.76
Income Tax collection had also ceased by that time.77 As the economy
contracted, foreign direct investment (FDI) dried up. In 1978, FDI stood
at $102.7 million. By 1983, FDI had fallen to -$26.9 million.78
Official government revenue was needed to maintain
international creditor confidence in the economy, so that foreign loans
70 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 183.
71 ALAN BEST, AFRICAN SURVEY, 189 (Wiley & Sons) (1977).
72 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 306.
73 TROPICAL AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, 255 (M.B.Gleave ed., Longman Scientific & Technical)
(1992).
74 See id. at 232; Best, supra note 71, at 192.
75 See Reno supra note 2, at 109-1 0.
76 See id. at 95.
77 Id. at 134.
78 Id.
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would continue to come in order to subsidize state industries and benefit
Stevens' cronies. To that end, the government took two steps in 1977 to
increase diamond revenue. First, the government sought to attract more
illegal diamonds into official channels. To accomplish this goal, the
government cut its export duty from 7.5% to 2.5% in 1977. 7 9 Second, the
government sought to end the De Beers controlled Diamond Corp. West
African's (DICORWAF) monopoly and also sought to introduce
additional international buyers to encourage price competition.8"
Although appearing benign, this last measure was intended to benefit
Stevens' cronies as they could now sell diamonds abroad and repatriate
less hard currency. Nonetheless, DICORWAF still bought the majority
of DIMINCO's output.81 Despite all of this, by the late 1970s DIMINCO
was a company in decline. DIMINCO had pruned personnel, halved the
security force, closed some treatment plants, unsuccessfully searched for
new minerals, and reduced capital expenditures.82 By 1977, the SLST-
who had been retained as technical managers-recommended the closure
of some operations."
D. Enter the 1980s and Exit Stevens
In 1981, a general strike, the first since independence, occurred
as a result of worsening economic conditions. In 1984, Fulah Bay
College, in operation since 1814, was closed. Stevens turned to the IMF
and World Bank for help in securing short-term credit. The IMF required
Stevens to privatize many state-run enterprises. The IMF had correctly
recognized that his cronies played a major role in running the state
enterprises.84 The IMF pressured Stevens to adopt austerity measures,
chief of which was ending the subsidy for imported rice.
Domestic rice production, never able to meet the demands of the
country, suffered as government-subsidized imported rice was
introduced. Farmers of cocoa and coffee-the main agricultural exports
-were hard hit because of global price decreases for the commodities.
Rice in Sierra Leone was used as a tool to undermine the power of the
chiefs. Stevens gave out to his cronies distribution rights to foreign-
grown rice. The government bought the rice with credit and then resold it
at subsidized prices to the cronies. The cronies, in turn, distributed the
rice to rural dwellers at a mark-up that was still below the price for
domestically produced rice. The goal of rice distribution was to reward
79 See Green supra note 11, at 119.
80 Id.
81 See Kaplan supra note 36, at 308.
82 See Greenhalgh supra note 11, at 219.
83 See id at 220.
84 See Reno supra note 2, at 138.
230
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: "CONFLICT DIAMONDS"
loyal chiefs and to punish those with an independent streak.8" It was this
scheme that the IMF sought to eliminate. It was unsuccessful.
In 1983, an agreement was signed with the SLST and the
government for production of kimberlite diamonds.86 In 1984 the SLST,
the original mining company in Sierra Leone, folded its tent and sold its
remaining shares to Precious Metals Mining Company (PMMC).87 Jamil,
Stevens' right hand man, controlled PMMC. The official diamond sector
was clearly failing and being subsumed by the informal sector, which
had now spun out of control. The state had finally lost control of the
production of diamonds, enabling private entrepreneurs to take over
Kono. The table below illustrates the progression from slide to collapse
of the legitimate diamond industry.
By the time Stevens retired in 1985, he had succeeded in
eliminating the inherited colonial economic order and in creating his
own. His economy thus looked somewhat like the following. Diamonds
were mined by his hand-picked cronies and then sent to Freetown. The
diamonds were exported with the assistance of Lebanese banks. The
diamonds were then used to obtain international credits to be used later
for rice imports, loans, and government patronage. Next, rice and other
goods were imported and distributed in order to co-opt chiefs at the local
level. Thus, the dissolution of the old system was complete. Stevens'
cronies, Lebanese businessmen and local chiefs, effectively marginalized
the Creoles. Stevens' last years in power, 1981-86, saw the GDP per
capita annual growth rate contract by -2.1% and the industrial growth
rate contract by -3.5%.88
E. The Slippery Slope to Collapse and De-Industrialization
Joseph Momah became Prime Minister following Stevens'
retirement in 1985. Momah gave Jamil direct control of DIMINCO.
Jamil, the Lebanese businessman with ties to Lebanese militiamen
fighting in Lebanon, controlled Sierra Leone's official diamond
mining. 89 Under Jamil, DIMINCO's legitimate exports dropped
dramatically, and by 1988, DIMINCO was exporting only 48,000 carats.
Jamil apparently had his own followers and ambitions to take care of.
Meanwhile, Momah wanted to create and reward his own
followers and curb the nation's new elite, the Lebanese businessmen.
Jamil and some of his closest advisors were implicated in a 1987 coup
attempt and Jamil fled to London. Momah then invited an Israeli firm to
85 See id. at 145.
86 See Greenhalgh supra note 11, at 220.
87 See PACNET supra note 17.
88 Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead, World Bank Policy Research
Report 241 (Oxford Press, 1994) Table A.15., "GDP per Capita Growth."
89 See PACNET supra note 17.
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control the diamond market and import rice with foreign exchange
earned from diamond sales abroad.90
To keep the economy afloat, Momah entered into agreements
with the Israelis and a structural adjustment program with the IMF and
World Bank. Under the Israelis, diamond exports rose 280% between
1985 and 1986. This allowed Momah to pay IMF arrears and guarantee
the structural adjustment program. From 1987 to 1991, the annual growth
rose to 0.8%.91
But unfortunately this turn for the better was not to last, as the
Israelis, in next to no time, pulled out of the economy by 1987.
Nevertheless, Momah still needed to maintain and co-opt his cronies.
The Israeli pullout and Momah's continued spending resulted in the
government spending more than the tax revenue could cover by 1989.
This imbalance led the government to borrow from the central bank and
to increase the money supply by printing more of it. The hope was that
these measures would help pay for expensive imports like rice.92 Foreign
exchange reserves fell further as export growth was -10.5% from 1981 to
1986. 9' By 1990, inflation was at 106.8%.94 To shore up its diamond
production, 49% of the government's shares in DIMONCO were
privatized.
III. The State Collapses: Sierra Leone from 1991 to the
Present.
A. Government Collapse & Rebellion
Scandal rocked the government in 1991 when it was discovered
that no work had been done on 32 government development contracts
even though $2 million had been spent on those projects.95 In 1991, the
government announced its intention of repurchasing 49% of DIMINCO,
which had been privatized by Stevens. 96 By 1993, the source of diamond
production was mainly small-scale mining. DIMINCO ceased operations
in March 1993 and went into liquidation in October 1993. 97 In January
1994, the government instituted a new mining policy that allowed non-
citizens to form companies while requiring the non-citizens to maintain
90 See Reno supra note 2, at 158.
91 See World Bank-Adjustment supra note 88, at 138.
92 GEORGE AYITTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS, 258 (1998); World Bank Adjustment, supra note 88, at
171. Meanwhile, spending on health and education from 1980 to 1989 fell 82.8%.
93 See World Bank Adjustment supra note 88, at 249.
94 See id. at 268.
95 See Ayittey supra note 92, at 72.
96 See Minerals Y.B, Vol. III, Mineral Ind. of Afr. (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1992) 199-200.
97 See Minerals Y.B, Vol. IV, Mineral Ind. of Afr. (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1993) 141-142
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minimum levels, or else their licenses would be revoked. 98 Next, rebels
entered the country through Liberia. Foday Sankoh, the 1971 coup
instigator, whose personal friendship with Charles Taylor, the Liberian
President, gained the rebels safe passage into Sierra Leone through
Liberia, led the rebels. The rebels had left Sierra Leone in 1987 due to
economic turmoil and had been training in Libya. 99 In Libya, Sankoh
teamed up with Ibrahim Bah, a Senegalese, who trained in Libya and had
fought in Afghanistan and then with the Hezbollah Terrorist group in
Lebanon. Bah, a close friend of Blaise Compaore's-the president of
Burkina Faso and future arms supplier to the region-in turn, introduced
Sankoh and another of Africa's infamous rebel leaders Charles Taylor, to
Gaddafi.100 This group of would-be rebel leaders would form an "axis" of
West African instability with its pole being Tripoli.
Once in Sierra Leone, Sankoh set about recruiting disaffected
urban youths, many of whom had not benefited from illegal diamond
digging and the "new economy."1 °1 Sankoh would pay his foreign
friends, like Stevens and Momah did, in diamonds.
The rebels of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) intended to
encircle the regional centers of Bo and Kenema. Bo is 25 miles south of
the former SLST Tongo Lease, which is a 15-mile long vein of
kimberlite diamonds.10 2 The RUF executed those who refused to join
their ranks and kidnapped boys and girls for guerilla training. The RUF
began their hallmark campaign of crude amputations that included feet,
hands, lips, ears, and noses. The focus of these brutal amputations was on
women and children.103 The RUF amputated to usurp the power of the
chiefs and introduce themselves as the new power brokers. The RUF
soon turned to mining and diamonds in order to enrich themselves and
their foreign supporters.
B. Of Guerillas, Diamonds & Mercenaries
By early 1992, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), with the
assistance of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by Nigeria and Guinea (who had a
defense pact with Sierra Leone) pushed the RUF back to the Sierra
98 See id. at 141
99 IBRAHIM ABDULLAH & MUANA, PATRICK, THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA
LEONE 176-177 (Christopher Clapham ed.) (1998); L. Renda, Ending Civil Wars: The Case of
Liberia, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 68 (1999).
100 An Axis Connected to Gaddafi: Leaders Trained in Libya Have Used War to Safeguard Wealth,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 2, 2001.
101 See Renda, supra note 99 at 177.
102 PAUL RICHARDS, FIGHTING FOR THE RAIN FOREST: WAR, YOUTH AND RESOURCES IN SIERRA
LEONE, 178 (1996).
103 PACNET, supra note 15.
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Leone-Liberia border. In 1992, disaffected SLA soldiers (the leaders
were sent to law school in the U.K. on scholarships after their removal)
launched a coup due to conditions at the front and a lack of pay.10 4 The
coup was successful, and the soldiers instituted a commission to look
into corruption and soon discovered malfeasance at ministerial levels.' °5
Yet, the soldiers also succumbed to graft and corruption in no time.
106
Soldiers sent to the front no longer fought the RUF, but instead turned to
diamond mining.10 7 In October 1992, Koidu, the main town in the
diamond mining areas, fell to the RUF. Seesaw battles raged, and by
early 1995, the RUF had the upper hand.
Facing imminent defeat by mid-1995, the military government
hired Executive Outcomes (EO), a private South African mercenary
outfit consisting of former Apartheid troops, to fight the rebels.'0 8 With
experience gained from fighting South Africa's wars in Angola and
Namibia, EO checked the RUF's advance and in less than a month had
nearly cleared them from the country. 109 Branch Energy, an offshoot-
mining component of EO, was given a 25-year lease on Sierra Leonean
diamond concessions. 1'0 By 1996, EO had killed several thousand RUF
combatants and forced the RUF into peace negotiations.
Sierra Leone had no foreign exchange to speak of, so the
government, as usual, signed away the diamonds to foreigners. In 1996,
allegations began to surface that EO officials were engaged in illegal
mining."' Between 1994 and 1996, Branch Energy had invested $12
million in exploratory mining. EO's success meant that a peace treaty
would be signed in November, but with a provision requiring EO and
ECOMOG to leave by January 1997. As EO prepared to pull out in late
1996, Branch Energy sold its entire stake in Sierra Leone to Diamond
Works, a company with connections to Sandline International Ltd.,
which was itself a mercenary company composed of former British
104 Africa Confidential Special Reports, Chronology of Sierra Leone: How Diamonds Fuelled the
Conflict, available at http://www.africa-confidential.com/special.htm (Last Visited Oct. 12, 2001).
105 See NEW AFRICAN September 1992 at 17.
106 See African Guerrillas supra note 99, at 181.
107 See id. at 182.
108 See id. at 185.
109 See id. at 187; PACNET, supra note 16.
110 Andres Perez, Sierra Leone's Diamond Wars, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, (June 2000),
available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/2000/06/O2siei-aleone (last visited Oct. 12,
2001); PACNET, supra note 16.
111 Supra.; Africa Confidential supra note 102; Conciliation Resources, Primary Industry and
Conflict in Sierra Leone (1997), available at http://www.c-r.org/occpapers/briefing3.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2001).
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Secret Service members. 112 Diamond Works' security would be provided
by Lifeguard, a mining security subsidiary of EO.113
Elections were held in February 1996. EO's success and the new
president helped forge the Abidjan Accords in November 1996, which
ended the war.' 14 The RUF would register as a political party and disarm,
and international observers would keep and monitor the peace.115 Yet, the
U.N. Security Council felt that the Clinton Administration would not
support a U.N. peacekeeping effort in Sierra Leone, and hence, none was
sent.1 16 The RUF failed to disarm or demobilize, and on 25 May 1997,
RUF soldiers overthrew the civilian administration of President Kabbah
and demanded $47 million before restoring the government.1 17 The RUF
assumed power, and Kabbah fled to Guinea and asked Nigeria to
intervene militarily. An orgy of violence gripped Freetown, with
increased murder, rape, looting, and torture, while all formal banking and
commerce operations ceased throughout the country. Even ECOMOG
forces were overpowered.
In February 1998, Kabbah was restored to power by Liberia.1 8
The RUF was pushed into the countryside and exacted its humiliation on
civilians by mutilating thousands more. The rebellion that began in 1991
claimed more than 75,000 lives, caused half a million refugees, internally
displaced 2.25 million people, and left thousands of mutilated people.
C. From U.N. Protection to British Intervention
In 1997 the U.N. Security Council imposed an arms embargo on
Sierra Leone.11 9 The U.N. responded to the deconstruction of Sierra
Leone in July 1998 by creating a peacekeeping operation, named
UNOMSIL, which consisted of 70 observers.1 20 The U.N. Security
112 See Africa Confidential supra note 104; Conciliation Resources, supra note 111.
113 See Conciliation Resources supra note 111.
114 K. Nowrot & E. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal
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Council modified the embargo in 1998 to allow the government to rearm
itself, but maintained the embargo inasmuch as it denied the RUF any
weapons. Regardless, the RUF continued to arm itself through the sale of
illegal diamonds, and from 1991 to 1999, the RUF was estimated to have
earned approximately $200 million a year from diamond smuggling. 121 In
1998 and 1999, five flights carrying weapons from Ukraine to Burkina
Faso-whose president was the Libyan-trained acquaintance of Sankoh,
Compaore-were diverted to the RUF. 122 In 1998 Bah, former Afghan
freedom fighter and Hezbollah member and co-founder of the RUF, met
with operatives of bin Laden's al Qaeda network in order to sell them
diamonds. The connection to al Qaeda was cemented in September 1998,
when Bah arranged for an al Qaeda visit to Monrovia. Bah and Abdullah
flew into Sierra Leone to discuss buying diamonds on a regular basis.
123
A few weeks later Bah arranged a visit for two more al Qaeda operatives
now on the FBI list, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed-both prime suspects in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings
in Africa-who took $100,000 in cash and received a parcel of diamonds
in an introductory deal.
124
On the military front, in 1998 the RUF launched "Operation
Spare No Soul" targeting civilians because of the capture of Sankoh by
ECOMOG forces.1 21 In January 1999, the RUF attacked UNOMSIL and
ECOMOG troops and reentered Freetown. During two weeks in
Freetown, the RUF torched homes and buildings, murdered 6,000
people, dismembered hundreds and kidnapped 2,000 children before
being repulsed by ECOMOG forces. 126
In July 1999 Kabbah and Sankoh signed the Lom6 Treaty,
ending the rebellion by the RUF. Sankoh was made chairman of the
Strategic Resources Commission, with responsibility over diamond
mining. Anyone who wished to mine diamonds had to go through him to
obtain a license.127 In essence a power shift had occurred, and rather than
the chiefs controlling the issuance of licenses as was once done in the old
121 Swiss Liberian Diamond Imports Rise in Sierra Leone War, REUTERS, Aug. 9, 2000.
122 BBC NEWS, Sierra Leone: The Balance of Forces (2000), available at
http://news.bbe.co.ul/hi/english/ world/africa/newsid_743000/743718.stm (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
123 Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone Rebels Raised
Millions, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 2,2001.
124 Id.
125 See EIU Sierra Leone supra note 120, at 24.
126 See PACNET supra note 18.
127 See Le Monde Diplomatique supra note 110; BBC NEWS, A Rebel's Best Friend (2000),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_745000/745194.stm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2001).
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economy, Sankoh would now personally seek to engage in this
kleptocracy. Sankoh set out to sell his own personal collection of
diamonds through the ministry, 128 and rebels came out of the bush selling
their own diamonds.
129
In April and May 2000, the Lom6 Accords fell apart as U.N.
forces came under attack in east Sierra Leone. In April 2000, ECOMOG
(except the Nigerian contingent that came under U.N. command) pulled
out. By May 2000, three key events had occurred: 1) 300 U.N. troops
were kidnapped, leading to the unraveling of the U.N. force; 2) 1,000
British troops and six Royal Naval warships arrived in Freetown to
restore order and train and arm Sierra Leone's army; 3) Sankoh was
arrested. The RUF's leadership, including three ministers, their
spokesman, the secretary general and two colonels, were also arrested.
D. The R UF's Renewable Fuel: "Conflict Diamonds"
The RUF supported their offensives through illegal diamond
mining in the occupied regions, which continued after the Lom6 Treaty
required the RUF to turn over occupied regions to the U.N. 13 0 Like its
predecessors, the RUF was aware of the resources to be had in the
diamond sector. Sankoh lined his pockets and encouraged his cronies-
just like Stevens and Momah before him-to rape the diamond industry
and co-opt the chiefs. Thus, the RUF did the same as others before them,
but co-opted the chiefs through violence. In May 2000 the Sierra Leone
Attorney General charged Sankoh with corruption and diamond
smuggling."'
As for the RUF's diamonds, they were smuggled through the old
smuggling routes to Liberia and sold in RUF-friendly Monrovia. 132 From
1998 to 2000, diamond exports from Sierra Leone were around $30
million while diamond exporting from Liberia-which possesses fewer
diamond fields-exploded to over $300 million. 133 In July 2000, Charles
Taylor, President of Liberia, responded to allegations of his involvement
in arms and diamond smuggling to and with the RUF: "When someone
gets up and says that Liberia is involved in diamond smuggling and gun
128 Corina Schuler, Sierra Leone: Papers Detail Rebel's Guilt, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
1 (May 15, 2000).
129 Diamond Dealers Rush to Sierra Leone to Buy Rebel Diamonds, AFRICAN MINING MONITOR
(Oct. 12, 1999).
130 See A Rebel's Best Friend supra note 127.
131 See Papers Details Guilt supra note 128.
132 BBC NEWS, Liberia's Diamond Links (2000), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ africa/newsid_839000/839206.stm (last visited Oct. 12,
2001).
133 See A Rebel's Best Friend supra note 127.
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running like a movie, you've got to be joking. What we have said, is with
all of the Western intelligence-for God's sake, these people have
satellites ... please bring me one photograph of a convoy."'13 4 In August
Western Intelligence, mainly the U.K. and U.S., showed Taylor and the
world his convoys. 135 The evidence was presented to the U.N. Sanctions
Committee, thereby implicating Charles Taylor and Blaise Compaore,
President of Burkina Faso. The evidence included allegations that Taylor
orchestrated the rebels, supplied food, medical supplies, and military
equipment, all in return for 60% of illegal diamonds smuggled out of
Sierra Leone. 36 Burkina Faso, which received around 30% of illegal
diamonds smuggled out of Sierra Leone, made fraudulent end user
certificates for weapons purchased in Bulgaria, which were then diverted
to the RUF. 137 But even the U.N. became tarred when, in September
2000, Nigerian troops, originally part of ECOMOG and later part of the
U.N. operation, were accused of diamond smuggling by the Indian
individual commanding the U.N. force. 138 As late as July 2001 Bah and
the RUF were mining diamonds for al Qaeda operatives.
Presently, Sierra Leone's legal system has collapsed because of
corruption and the recent civil war. The country's institutions for the
administration of justice (both civil and criminal) are barely functional.
The courts in Freetown have no law library for research, recording
facilities, or secretarial staff.139 The court system outside Freetown is
nonexistent, with courtrooms destroyed and personnel killed. There is no
police force to bring perpetrators to justice.1 40 Jails do not provide food
for inmates. The British have provided assistance to the rebuilding effort
by developing programs aimed at re-establishing and training the
national police force. 141
Conclusion
British colonial policy in West Africa created a system of
patronage. Unlike other countries in West Africa, Sierra Leone also had a
134 Id.
135 BBC NEWS, West African Diamond Racket Exposed, available at
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Creole urban population of freed slaves. These Creoles were educated
and given jobs in the civil service. The interior was known as the "white
man's grave," and no systematic effort was made to develop the
hinterland until pressure from another expanding colonial power pushed
the British colonial officials to go to the hinterland to protect Freetown.
Unwilling to pay for the administration of the interior, Sierra Leone
became a hybrid of British Imperialism using both systems employed in
Africa. The discovery of diamonds led to the granting of a monopoly
over the diamonds, in response to colonial protectionism in the face of
the Great Depression. The monopoly followed the colonial policy of
using local chiefs and co-opting them.
At independence, Sierra Leone inherited a system of reliance on
one major export-diamonds. It also inherited the economic dominance
of the Creoles and the subservience of the chiefs. Resentment for the
Creoles, and to a lesser extent, fear of Mende domination, led to Stevens'
political victory. Stevens' rule was akin to Mobuto's in Zaire, but much
less publicized. Where the West financed Mobuto's kleptocracy,
diamonds financed Stevens. Stevens' creation of a new economy
eliminated the inherited monopoly and alienated the Creoles and co-
opted the chiefs. The economy suffered widely as Stevens and his
cronies sought to enrich themselves. This disconnect led to the rise of
frustrated urban youths who eventually became the backbone of
Sankoh's RUF. The RUF needed to finance their movement and what
better way than through diamonds-symbol of the elite that had caused
great misery and had instituted the new "Black Colonialism."
Sierra Leone has now come back full circle. Freetown is the
economic heart of the country with the diamond district tenuously held
by a foreign force-the U.N. The U.N. and the country are watched over
by British troops who do not stray too far from Freetown and leave the
interior as the black man's grave.
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